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INTEREST OF THE AMICI 
Amici are national and Florida-based health care provider and consumer 
organizations that have worked with the Medicaid program over its 46-year 
history.  While each Amicus has particular interests in the Medicaid program, they 
collectively bring to the Court an in-depth understanding of how the Medicaid Act 
has been amended and/or implemented over time.   The parties have consented to 
the filing of this Brief. 
Founded in 1930, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) is a national, 
non-profit organization dedicated to furthering the interests of children’s health 
and the pediatric specialty.  The majority of people who are covered by Medicaid 
are children, and pediatricians interact with Medicaid more than any other leading 
physicians’ society.  Established in 1872, the American Public Health Association 
(APHA) aims to protect families and communities from preventable, serious health 
threats and strives to assure that community-based health promotion and disease 
prevention activities and preventive health services are universally accessible.  
APHA represents a broad array of health professionals and others who care about 
the health of their communities, many of whose residents are uninsured or depend 
on Medicaid for their health care.  The National Association of Community Health 
Centers (NACHC) is the membership organization for federally qualified health 
centers (FQHCs).  There are more than 1200 FQHCs with more than 7000 sites 
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serving 23 million patients nationwide.  Approximately 35% of health center 
patients are Medicaid recipients; approximately 40% are uninsured.  NACHC 
estimates that the Medicaid expansions contained in ACA will result in health 
centers serving approximately 18.4 million Medicaid recipients by 2015.  The 
Florida Pediatric Society/Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
(FPS) is a non-profit professional organization of pediatricians and pediatric 
specialists.  In the most recent Federal fiscal year, more that 1.6 million children 
were enrolled in Florida’s Medicaid program.  A substantial proportion of FPS’s 
approximately 2100 members are enrolled as Medicaid providers in Florida and 
provide primary care and specialty services to children enrolled in Florida’s 
Medicaid program.   
Families USA is the national organization for health care consumers.  For 
the past 28 years, Families USA has led various coalition efforts designed to 
expand health coverage for low-income families, including the National Medicaid 
Coalition that it chairs.  Florida Community Health Action Information Network 
(CHAIN) is a statewide consumer health care advocacy organization.  Priorities of 
Florida CHAIN include ensuring that Medicaid beneficiaries are protected against 
barriers to access and working to obtain coverage for Florida’s estimated 4.1 
million uninsured.  Florida Legal Services, Inc. (FLS) is a statewide nonprofit law 
firm founded in 1973 to expand the availability of legal assistance to the poor.  As 
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a state support center for over 40 legal aid/legal services offices throughout 
Florida, FLS works with low income Floridians who are in desperate need of 
health care services.  Florida has the third highest rate of uninsurance in the U.S.  
The National Partnership for Women and Families is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan organization that uses public education and advocacy to promote 
access to quality, affordable health care, work and family policies, and fairness in 
the workplace.  Medicaid is a particularly vital source of health care for women of 
reproductive age (15-44).   
United Cerebral Palsy (UCP) is one of the oldest and largest national health 
organizations dedicated to improving the lives of people with disabilities, many of 
whom receive services pursuant to the Medicaid program.  Founded in 1949, the 
organization advances the independence, productivity and full citizenship of 
people with disabilities through a nationwide network of approximately 100 
affiliates across the country.  The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) is 
the nation’s largest grassroots mental health organization dedicated to improving 
the lives of individuals and families affected by mental illness. Founded in 1979, 
NAMI has over 1100 state and local affiliates that engage in research, education, 
support, and advocacy.  The National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) is the 
non-profit membership association of protection and advocacy (P&A) agencies 
that are located in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
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Territories.  For 30 years, P&As have worked with children and adults with 
disabilities who depend on Medicaid-funded services and supports to enable them 
to live in the community rather than in institutions.  Disability Rights Florida, 
formerly the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, is the designated P&A 
for the State of Florida.  In 2009, Florida Disability Rights assisted approximately 
7,500 Floridians, with the largest group of requests for assistance in the area of 
securing access to health care supports and services.  The Judge David L. Bazelon 
Center for Mental Health Law is a national public interest organization founded in 
1972 to advocate for the rights of individuals with mental disabilities.  
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part.  No party or 
party’s counsel contributed money to fund preparation or submission of this brief.  
No person, other than amici and amici’s counsel, contributed money intended to 
fund preparation or submission of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
 Whether the district court properly held that the Medicaid provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) do not impermissibly coerce the 
Plaintiff States or commandeer their Medicaid programs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint challenged provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that expand Medicaid to 
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childless, non-disabled adults whose incomes are below 133% of the federal 
poverty level.  Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 83-86.  Part of the State Plaintiffs’ 
―coercion and commandeering‖ claim was that the ACA works such a 
transformation in Medicaid that the States have no choice but to spend money and 
provide services in ways that are ―radically changed‖ from what was required by 
the Medicaid Act on the day before the ACA was enacted.  Mem. in Supp. of Pls’ 
Mot. for Summ. J. (Plfs. Mem.) at 25.  According to the Plaintiffs, the Act converts 
Medicaid into a ―federally-imposed universal healthcare regime‖ that they have no 
choice but to accept.  One can expect the States to reiterate their coercion and 
commandeering assertions before this Court. 
The Court need not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ complaints about how the 
ACA changes Medicaid.  It can join the five Circuits and the district court below—
all of which have held that a ―coercion‖ claim does not lie against a Spending 
Clause cooperative-federalism program when, as here, a State has the legal right to 
withdraw from the program.
1
  If, however, the Court does decide to address the 
                                                          
1
Over half of the Plaintiff States’ Federal appellate courts have rejected application 
of the coercion theory (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and 
Wyoming).  See State of Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (Docket # 150 at 
10) (collecting cases).  Fifteen States did not submit evidence of the specific 
impact of the Medicaid provisions (Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).  The Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, 
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nature of the changes that the ACA makes in Medicaid, it will find that the 
Plaintiffs’ coercion and commandeering claims find no support in the history and 
structure of the Medicaid Act, as originally enacted or as Congress and the States 
have changed it over time.
 
 
ARGUMENT 
Medicaid is part of the Social Security Act, enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
Spending Clause authority.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-1.  From the time it was 
enacted, Medicaid has conditioned federal funding on States’ agreements to 
comply with a series of mandates.  The Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
Congress’s broad authority to enact such legislation pursuant to the Spending 
Clause.  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that cooperative-federalism 
programs such as Medicaid, where States accept Federal money together with 
Federal conditions for how that money may be used, are constitutional.  483 U.S. 
203, 107 S.Ct. 2793 (1987).  See also, e.g., Okla. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 
127, 67 S.Ct. 544 (1947) (affirming Congress’s broad power to set conditions for 
the receipt of Federal funds); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 
883 (1937) (affirming Congress’s authority under taxing and spending clauses to 
enact Social Security Act); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Kansas, Maine, Washington, and Wyoming Plaintiffs are, thus, seeking relief on a 
claim that has been rejected by their Federal courts of appeals and that they have 
not supported with factual attestations.   
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(2004) (unanimously reaffirming broad scope of Congress’s spending power); cf. 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980) (holding Congress’s ability 
to refuse to provide Medicaid funds necessarily involves the ability to subsidize 
only certain procedures and to exclude even medically necessary abortions from 
those covered procedures).
2
 
I. The Affordable Care Act Does Alter Medicaid’s Structure or Purpose. 
 
A. Medicaid’s Core Framework 
 
Medicaid was added to the Social Security Act in 1965 as Title XIX.  
Congress invited States to accept significant Federal funding—half or more of 
State expenditures—in return for providing coverage for specific groups of people 
(additional groups at State option) for a specific set of services (additional services 
at State option).  Since 1965, Congress has amended Medicaid on numerous 
                                                          
2
 In considering this issue, the District Court cited Lynn A Baker, The Spending 
Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195 (2001), which argues that 
conditional Federal spending programs operate to allow politically powerful states 
to oppress less powerful states.  That was not the argument being made by the 
States here.  Indeed, the Plaintiffs include officials from Alaska, Idaho, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota, which are among the states receiving the most per 
capita benefit from transfers of federal dollars.  Id. at 211-12.  Also, Professor 
Baker does not explain how the coercion theory should be applied in cases such as 
this one.  Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts 
Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345,372-78 (Dec. 2008); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State 
Decisions, 88 B. U. L. REV. 875, 919 (Oct. 2008) (―The difficulty is that Baker sees 
coercion in virtually every federal-state exchange.‖); Robert T. Bull, The Virtue of 
Vagueness, A Defense of South Dakota v. Dole, 56 DUKE L. J. 279, 293-300 (Oct. 
2006).   
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occasions.  Whenever these changes have occurred, including those in the ACA, 
they have not altered the program’s essential framework. 
First, Medicaid is a means-tested program that provides health insurance 
coverage to people who generally cannot afford to purchase private health 
insurance.  The Medicaid Act does not establish a ―government run‖ health system 
but rather is an insurance coverage program that enables enrolled individuals to 
gain access to private health care providers, including doctors, community health 
clinics, pharmacies, home health aides, hospitals, and nursing homes.  Medicaid’s 
purpose is achieved through a statutory structure that entitles eligible individuals to 
coverage for items and services collectively known as ―medical assistance.‖3   
                                                          
3
 The ACA clarifies the meaning of ―medical assistance.‖  See ACA § 2304 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)).  The clarification responds to some recent court 
decisions that limited medical assistance simply to payment of a provider claim 
when and if it was submitted.  E.g. Okla. Ch. of Am. Acad. of Ped. v. Fogarty, 472 
F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (10th
 
Cir. 2007) (refusing to follow Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 
709 (11th Cir. 1998)). As Congress made abundantly clear, the clarification was 
made to ―correct any misunderstanding‖ and ―to conform th[e] definition to the 
longstanding administrative use and understanding of the term‖ prior to these 
recent cases.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-299, 1st Sess., at 649-50, 2009 WL 3321420 
(Leg. Hist.) (Oct. 14, 2009); see also 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, 1856, 2010 WL 
1006359 (Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (explaining on the House 
floor the committee report's rationale for the clarification); Id. at H1891, 1967, 
2010 WL 1027566 (Mar. 21, 2010).  The clarification does not change the 
responsibilities States assume when they accept Federal funds, nor does it require 
States to directly provide medical services by establishing state-owned or operated 
facilities or employing providers.  The clarification does, however, confirm that 
this Court properly applied the term when it decided Doe v. Chiles in 1998. 
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Second, the Medicaid Act creates an entitlement for States that ensures that 
all eligible expenditures qualify for federal funding at the appropriate federal 
matching rate.  This State-Federal partnership of ―cooperative federalism‖ 
represents an extraordinary commitment on the part of the Federal government, 
which picks up at least half of the States’ costs of paying for health care services 
and administering the program.  Federal funding for expenditures typically can 
range from 50-83%, with higher funding for States with lower per capita 
incomes—a feature designed to ensure that Federal funds flow to States with the 
greatest need.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a).  Federal funds cover at least 50% of the 
costs of State program administration, id. at § 1396b(a)(1), and, for some activities 
and services, 100% of the costs, id. at § 1396b(a) (providing full Federal funding 
for electronic health records development, immigrant status verification systems, 
and Medicaid services provided through the Indian Health Service). 
Third, State participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary.  States 
choosing to participate and receive Federal funding must submit a Medicaid plan 
to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Once approved, a State must 
operate its program consistent with the Medicaid Act and regulations.  See, e.g., 
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2513 (1990). And 
while Federal payments have always come with strings attached, an unwilling 
State can opt out by withdrawing its Medicaid plan.  See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 
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F.3d 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting Medicaid is a Spending Clause program 
where Florida ―always retains th[e] option‖ to withdraw); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) 
(limiting Federal funding to States with an approved plan); 42 C.F.R. § 430.48 
(regarding repayment if State terminates participation).
4
 
Fourth, while different and changing obligations have been enacted over 
time, the Medicaid Act has always set a minimum floor of requirements while 
allowing States a great deal of flexibility in how to attain the floor and/or exceed it, 
including with respect to the amount and mix of services they will cover, provider 
payments, and procedures regarding eligibility and enrollment.  Indeed, a hallmark 
of the Medicaid program is the considerable discretion that States are given to 
tailor their Medicaid programs and, thus, there is considerable variation of 
Medicaid programs from State to State.  Finally, as with other Spending Clause 
enactments, Congress and the States have used Medicaid not simply as a funding 
mechanism to help poor, elderly, and medically indigent Americans but also to 
address broader national concerns, such as reducing infant mortality, improving 
childhood immunization rates, and encouraging community-based alternatives to 
institutional long-term care. 
 
                                                          
4
 As Judge Vinson recognized, the States know they can terminate participation in 
Medicaid.  See State of Fla. ex rel. Bondi, No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (Docket # 150 at 9) (citing declarations from state 
Medicaid officials from Nevada and South Dakota). 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/12/2011     Page: 17 of 33
16 
B. Medicaid’s Consistent Structure Over Time 
The intrinsic framework described above has held true for the 46-year 
history of the Medicaid program, as illustrated by the following legislative reforms, 
including the ACA:  
1965:   The Medicaid Act was enacted to offer States the option to 
participate in a Federal-State partnership designed to improve the health access and 
status of poor and disabled Americans.  See Social Security Act Amendments of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, § 121 (adding Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. § 1396).  
Participating states were required to make medical assistance available to low-
income residents who were receiving public cash assistance—Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the 
Permanently and Totally Disabled.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).  From this 
eligibility floor, States were given options to make medical assistance available to 
families and people with disabilities whose incomes were too high to qualify for 
public cash assistance. See Id. at § 1396a(a)(10)(B), (C). 
Likewise, participating States were required to cover a minimum scope of 
benefits, primarily hospital and nursing facility services, laboratory and X-ray 
services, and physicians’ services.  Id. at §§ 1396a(a)(13), 1396d(a)(1)-(5).  States 
could also receive Federal funding for a number of other, mostly non-acute, often 
community-based services, including outpatient prescription drugs, preventive 
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screening services for children, and dental and home health services.  Id. at §§ 
1396d(a)(6)-(15).  In addition to the eligibility and service mandates and options, 
the new law included protections for consumers and participating providers.  For 
example, participating States needed to assure the Federal government that medical 
assistance would be furnished with ―reasonable promptness to all eligible 
individuals,‖ id. at § 1396a(a)(8), and that enrollees would receive due process 
when claims were denied, id. at § 1396a(a)(3). 
Thus, the original Medicaid Act was framed to include minimum Federal 
requirements governing who was to be covered and what sorts of services they 
would receive, along with a variety of State options to exceed the Federally-
mandated floor.  In addition, the law required some protections in the manner by 
which people qualified for and received services and how participating providers 
were to be treated.  These provisions remain an integral part of the Medicaid 
program today and have not been changed by the ACA. 
1967:  Congress amended the Act to require States to cover previously 
optional early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment (EPSDT) services 
for Medicaid-eligible children under age 21.  See Social Security Act Amendments 
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, §§ 224, 302 (amending then effective 
version of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)).  Through EPSDT, the Federal and State 
partnership evolved to cover well-child examinations; vision, hearing and dental 
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care; vaccines, and services needed to address health problems.  Thus, the service 
floor was lifted, and all States now cover EPSDT.
5
   
1972:   Although Medicaid began by confining its minimum eligibility 
requirements to standards set by state cash welfare programs—which did and still 
do vary dramatically from State to State—it soon changed to provide some 
nationwide eligibility standards for elderly people and people with disabilities.  
Seven years after Medicaid’s enactment, the Social Security Act Amendments of 
1972 established Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a single Federal cash 
assistance program for low-income elderly people and people with disabilities that 
replaced previously State-operated cooperative-federalism programs.  See Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, §§ 301 
(replacing Title XVI of the Social Security Act) and § 209(b) (described below); 
see also Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 13 (conforming amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)).  Congress encouraged States to extend Medicaid to everyone 
who was eligible for the newly-enacted SSI program.  However, concerned that 
some States might exercise their right to terminate participation in the Medicaid 
                                                          
5
 Congress has maintained focus on improving the health of low-income children.  
For example, EPSDT coverage has been clarified, see Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, § 6403 (adding 
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) and amending § 1396a(a)(43)), and strengthened to include a 
Federally funded pediatric vaccines program, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, § 13631 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 
1396s). 
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program rather than implement the mandatory expansion, Congress gave States the 
option to provide Medicaid to only those people who would have been eligible for 
Medicaid under a State’s prior State Medicaid plan.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (also 
called 209(b)).  See S. Rep. 93-553, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1973); see also 
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38-39 & nn. 3-6, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 2637-
38 & nn. 3-6 (1981).  Also, all States maintained flexibility to cover people with 
disabilities whose incomes exceeded the SSI limits.
6
  Notably, the ACA’s 
Medicaid coverage for childless adults uses a national financial eligibility standard, 
just as Congress did in 1972 for elders and people with disabilities. 
1981:   In 1981, the Federal government revised coverage of long term care 
services in Medicaid, which were focused on institutional care, to encompass home 
and community-based care.  See Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2176, 95 Stat. 357, § 2176 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396n(c)).  States that elected to move their programs in the direction of 
community integration were required to adhere to coverage and service conditions, 
which, if satisfied, would result in expanded Federal funding to cover both medical 
                                                          
6
 All 26 of the Plaintiff States now cover, as a matter of state option, at least some 
elderly people or people with disabilities with incomes up to or above 300% of the 
SSI level—which is about 224% of Federal poverty level.  See NCHSD, State 
Medicaid Buy-In Program—Fourth Quarter 2008, at 
http://www.nchsd.org/libraryfiles/MBI/MBI_Summaries_Q4_2008.pdf; Kaiser 
Family Found., 2009 Comparison Charts, at 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=60&cat=4 and 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=817&cat=4. 
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and non-medical services and supports.  Enrollees who needed an institutional 
level of care could receive these services in the community if the State provided 
necessary assurances to the Federal government that the coverage would be cost-
effective and that people’s health and welfare would be protected.  Id.  Yet again, 
the Medicaid Act was amended to enhance State flexibility while maintaining 
underlying Federal standards aimed at improving the welfare of elderly people and 
people with disabilities.  Indeed, State community-based care innovation has 
flourished, but under comprehensive Federal standards. 
1984-90:  Between 1984 and 1990, Congress enacted legislation that in 
fundamental respects parallels the ACA’s extension of coverage to poor adults.  
Over this time period and through a series of incremental reforms, Congress 
established a national floor of coverage for children and pregnant women.  This 
floor is accompanied by State options to reach further, but a solid floor remains, 
nonetheless.  Certain reforms that began as options ultimately became mandatory, 
as follows: 
Prior to 1984, as noted above, participating States were required to extend 
Medicaid to children and pregnant women receiving cash assistance through the 
AFDC program.  States were given the option to extend coverage to children, 
including unborn children, with AFDC-level income but living in families that did 
not qualify for cash assistance, typically because of the presence of two parents in 
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the household.  In 1984, this optional coverage was made mandatory for children 
under age five and first-time pregnant women who met the financial eligibility 
standards for the State’s AFDC program.  See Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 96-369, 98 Stat. 494, § 2361 (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(n) and 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III)).  In 1985, States were required to cover all pregnant 
women who met the financial eligibility criteria for AFDC.  See Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, § 
9501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(n)).  A year later, the Medicaid Act was 
amended to give States the option to cover pregnant women and young children 
with low family incomes that nevertheless exceeded AFDC payment levels.  See 
OBRA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, § 9401 (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(l), 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IX)). 
In 1988, these options began to be transformed into requirements, through 
phased in coverage tied to the Federal poverty level, rather than the AFDC 
program. Coverage ultimately reached all children, birth to age 5, and pregnant 
women with family incomes under 133% of the federal poverty level and, in the 
case of children aged 5-18, with family incomes under 100% of the poverty level.  
See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), Pub. L. 100-360, 102 
Stat. 683, § 302 (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV), 1396a(l)(2)(A)(iii)); 
OBRA of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, § 6401 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), 1396a(a)(A)(10)(A)(ii), 1396a(l)); OBRA of 1990, Pub. L. 
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 4601 (same).  During this time, Congress allowed 
States, as it had during the previous 25 years, to extend benefits to needy children 
and pregnant women with incomes above the minimum coverage floors.  Id.
7
 
Additionally, to facilitate enrollment of these populations, the 1990 
Congress required States to assure that their Medicaid applications would be 
accepted not only at welfare offices but also at health care sites frequented by 
children and pregnant women, such as community health centers and hospitals.  42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(55) (added by OBRA of 1990, § 4602)).  Beyond this 
requirement, the Act permitted States to allow Medicaid-participating providers to 
make ―presumptive eligibility‖ determinations and obtain Federal funding for 
services at the earliest possible time and without penalty if the child or woman was 
later found not to be Medicaid eligible.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-1 (optional 
presumptive eligibility for pregnant women, added in 1986); 1396r-1a (optional 
presumptive eligibility for children, added in 1997).
8
 
                                                          
7
 Twenty-two of the Plaintiff States–all but Alabama, North Dakota, Utah and 
Wyoming–provide, as a matter of state option, Medicaid coverage for at least some 
groups of children or pregnant women that exceeds the 100%/133% Federal 
poverty-level minimums.  See Kaiser Family Found., 2011 Comparison Charts, at 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=77&cat=4, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=76&cat=4, and 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=54&cat=4. 
8
 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-1(k) (optional presumptive eligibility for childless 
adults, added by ACA § 2001(a)(4) (eff. 2014)).  
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At the same time, Congress and the States addressed eligibility floors for 
low-income elderly and disabled people, once again beginning with options that 
later were transformed into basic requirements, with flexibility for States regarding 
how these requirements would be achieved and to offer more than was minimally 
required.  For example, lower-income elderly people and people with disabilities 
who were eligible for Medicare typically needed help to meet that program’s costs, 
including monthly Medicare Part B premiums.  In 1986, Congress created a new 
Medicaid option through which States could receive federal payments toward 
coverage of Medicare cost-sharing for people whose incomes were at or below a 
State-specified threshold at or below the poverty line.  See OBRA of 1986, § 9403 
(adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(p), 1396a(a)(10)(E)).  Two years later, Congress 
converted the option into a requirement for States to phase in coverage of at least 
Medicare premiums and cost-sharing for all persons with incomes below 100% of 
poverty.  See MCCA, § 301 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(E), 1396d(p)).  
Then, two years later, Congress required States to phase in Medicare cost-sharing 
for people with family incomes up to 120% of the poverty line, with the phase-in 
to be fully effective by 1995.  See OBRA of 1990, § 4501.  Finally, in § 4732 of 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, Congress created the ―Qualified 
Individual‖ program, through which most states provide cost-sharing assistance to 
Medicare beneficiaries with incomes up to 135% of poverty.  Before this, President 
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Reagan had developed and Congress had enacted an option for States to ignore 
parental income of any amount and provide Medicaid to disabled children in their 
homes rather than institutions.  Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, § 134 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(3)). 
1993–2008:   There is also ample precedent for Medicaid coverage of 
childless adults prior to enactment of the ACA.  Since Medicaid’s inception, States 
have been authorized to obtain Federal funding to implement Medicaid 
demonstration projects.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1315.  States began to use this option in 
the mid 1990s to extend Medicaid coverage to childless, nondisabled adults whose 
incomes fall below a State-set percentage of the poverty level:  This is precisely 
the population group assisted by the ACA.  By 2008, 18 States had received 
Federal permission to extend coverage to childless, nondisabled adults using 
Federal Medicaid funds, including Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, 
Michigan, and Utah.  See Keavney Klein & Sonya Schwartz, Nat. Acad. for State 
Health Pol., State Efforts to Cover Low-Income Adults Without Children 3 (Sept. 
2008). 
2010:   In the context of covering America’s uninsured, the ACA’s Medicaid 
provisions are a step towards better health care coverage and better health for low-
income people, and this is just another step along the same path Medicaid has 
followed for the past 46 years.   
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Simplified rules for who is eligible, with no requirement to apply for public 
cash assistance in order to get health care.  Over time, Medicaid has provided 
coverage to low-income children, pregnant women, elders and people with 
disabilities on the basis of their incomes, not their receipt of public welfare cash 
assistance.  For more than 15 years, all States have been required to provide 
coverage for young children and pregnant women whose family incomes are at or 
below 133% of the poverty level, and for more than 10 years, most States have 
been required to provide coverage for Medicare beneficiaries with family incomes 
below 135% of poverty.  Now, beginning in 2014, the ACA adjusts the Medicaid 
eligibility floor so that States not already doing so will extend coverage to 
nondisabled adults with family incomes below 133% of the poverty level.  See 
ACA § 2001.  States have the option to implement the expansion early.  As is 
typical for the Medicaid program, States retain options to provide additional 
coverage beyond the Federal floor.  Id.  As noted, all 26 of the State Plaintiffs have 
provided coverage for at least some adults whose family incomes exceed 133% of 
poverty, while 22 of the 26 States have provided coverage for children and 
pregnant women whose family incomes exceed that level. 
Federal consideration for State budgets.  The ACA contains exceptionally 
generous Federal funding to cover the costs associated with expanding coverage. 
At its outset in 2014, the improved Medicaid access will be entirely Federally 
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funded.  Even after State participation in funding is fully phased in by 2020, States 
will only be responsible for 10% of the costs associated with this group.  See 
Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act, § 1201 (adding 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1396b(y)(1)).  Additionally, while the new law includes a ―maintenance of 
effort‖ provision to discourage States from dropping coverage between now and 
2014, there is an exception to this requirement for States that are in a ―budget 
crisis.‖  See ACA § 2001(b) (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(74), 1396a(gg)).9 
State options to cover additional home and community-based services.  As 
noted above, Medicaid has always provided for a mix of mandatory and optional 
eligibility categories and mandatory and optional services and, since 1981, has 
included State options for covering additional home and community-based 
services.  The ACA establishes several new State options to obtain Federal funds 
                                                          
9
 By comparison, the State and Federal governments typically made the Medicaid 
expansions of the 1970s and 1980s using the regular Medicaid matching rates.  
Moreover, there is nothing unprecedented in Congress’s attempting to ensure that 
States maintain their Medicaid programs while the adult coverage is being phased 
in.  Maintenance of effort provisions were utilized early on, see Social Security Act 
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, § 2214, and Congress and 
the States have followed this pattern on numerous previous occasions.  E.g., 
OBRA of 1986, § 9401(b) (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l)(4)(A)); Pub. L. No. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330, § 4101(e)(4) (1987) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l)(4)(A)). 
Nor is it unprecedented for there to be a link between States’ maintenance of 
Medicaid efforts and enhanced Federal funding.  See American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, § 5001(f) (2009) 
(making temporary, substantial increases in each State’s Federal funding, but, ―to 
prevent constrictions of income eligibility requirements,‖ specifying that States 
would not get increases if they employed eligibility standards more restrictive than 
those in effect on July 1, 2008). 
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for dynamic, innovative programs for covering long-term care and home care for 
older people and people with disabilities.  See, e.g., ACA § 2401 (Community First 
Choice), ACA § 2403 (Money Follows the Person Rebalancing). 
In sum, while altered over its history to improve health access for poor 
people, the Medicaid bargain remains much the same today, after passage of the 
ACA, as it was in 1965.  The Medicaid Act continues to provide States an 
entitlement to Federal funding for administration and services provided through the 
Medicaid program.  Participation is not compulsory.  However, to participate, 
States must adhere to minimum federal floor requirements with respect to 
eligibility, services, and program administration.  Beyond the floor, States have 
considerable discretion in how they will implement the Federal requirements and 
to decide whether to go beyond what the Federal law requires.
10
 
                                                          
10
 The District Court issued declaratory relief invalidating the entire ACA, 
including the Medicaid provisions, on the theory that otherwise constitutional 
provisions could not be severed from the unconstitutional individual mandate.  The 
United States’ arguments on this subject, Br. for Appellants at 55-60, fully apply to 
the ACA’s Medicaid title.  The Medicaid amendments are in Title II of the ACA, 
while the individual mandate is in Title I.  The Medicaid amendments make 
changes in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, while the individual mandate itself 
involves an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, with associated amendments 
to the Public Health Service Act.  The Medicaid provisions independently promote 
Congress’s purpose of making affordable coverage available to low-income 
Americans.  As the Court noted in New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186, 112 S.Ct. 
2408, 2434 (1992), ―Common sense suggests that where Congress has enacted a 
statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where Congress has included a series 
of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the invalidation of 
one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall intent to be 
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Conclusion 
The Court should affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Four of the Second 
Amended Complaint.   
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frustrated.‖  Moreover, it was not appropriate for the District Court to draw any 
inferences against severability from the fact that H.R. 3590, as it passed the Senate 
in December 2009 and then the House in March 2010, did not contain a 
severability clause.  Order Granting Summary Judgment at 67-68; Order 
[Clarification and Stay] at 6.  Contrary to the District Court’s misreading of the 
legislative history, the Senate did not delete a severability clause from H.R. 3590 
as originally received from the House: that bill, then labeled the Service Members 
Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, did not contain a severability clause.  S. 1796, 
the earlier Senate health reform bill from which the Senate derived much of the 
language Congress ultimately enacted, did not contain a severability clause either.   
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